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The Race to the Bottom and Federal
Environmental Regulation:
A Response to Critics
Richard L. Revesz*
Five years ago, I challenged the race-to-the-bottom rationale
for allocating to the federal government responsibility over
environmental regulation.' Last year, I criticized the manner
in which the federal environmental statutes have dealt with
the problem of interstate externalities.2 In two more recent
works, I have further extended
my analysis of federalism and
3
regulation.
environmental
In the past few months, articles by Kirsten Engel,4 Daniel
Esty,5 Joshua Sarnoff,6 and Peter Swire 7 have taken issue with
* Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. I am grateful
for the comments of Lewis Kornhauser and Richard Stewart. The generous
financial support of the Filomen D'Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Research
Fund at the New York University School of Law is also gratefully acknowledged.
1. See Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the 'Race to the Bottom" Rationale for FederalEnvironmentalRegulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992).
2. See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate EnvironmentalExternalities,144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341 (1996).
3. See Richard L. Revesz, Federalismand EnvironmentalRegulation:A

Normative Critique, in THE NEW FEDERALISM: CAN THE STATES BE TRUSTED?
97 (John Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast eds., 1997) [hereinafter Revesz, A

Normative Critique];Richard L. Revesz, Federalismand EnvironmentalRegulation:Lessons for the European Union and the InternationalCommunity, 83
VA. L. REV. 1331 (1997) [hereinafter Revesz, Lessons for the European Union
and the InternationalCommunity].
4. See Kirsten H. Engel, State EnvironmentalStandard-Setting:Is There
a "Race"and Is It "to the Bottom"?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997).
5. See Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing EnvironmentalFederalism,95 MICH.
L. REV. 570 (1996).
6. See Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Continuing Imperative (But Only from a
NationalPerspective)for FederalEnvironmentalProtection,7 DUKE ENVTL. L.
&POL'YF. 225 (1997).
7. See Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability:
Explaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictionsin Environmental
Law, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 67 (1996).
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my work in this area, particularly with my indictment of the
race-to-the-bottom rationale for federal environmental regulation.
In this essay, I respond to these critics, hoping that the ensuing debate will help to clarify a set of issues that has considerable public policy significance.
I. MY APPROACH
Before responding to the arguments raised by my critics, I
set forth briefly the main components of my approach to the
analysis of the allocation of responsibility over environmental
regulation between the federal government and the states.
A.

A PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF DECENTRALIZATION

My starting point is a rebuttable presumption in favor of
decentralization. 8 This presumption rests on three independent
grounds.9 First, our country is large and diverse; it is therefore
likely that different regions have different preferences for environmental protection. Environmental protection addresses an
important resource-allocation question: as a society we can
generally purchase additional environmental protection at
some price, paid in the currency of jobs, wages, shareholders'
profits, tax revenues, and econbmic growth. Given the existence of
the states as plausible regulatory units, the tradeoffs reflecting
the preferences of citizens of different regions should not be
wholly disregarded in the regulatory process, absent strong
reasons for doing so.
In the case of some social decisions such reasons are present. The example of federal civil rights legislation, which
trumped deeply held preferences of a large region of the country,
is perhaps most prominent. But while I am sympathetic to the
argument that the protection of a minimum level of public
health ought to be viewed in quasi-constitutional terms and
guaranteed throughout the country, as I explain below, it
would stretch this principle beyond its breaking point to say
that it calls for the federalization of every decision having public health consequences. 10
Second, the benefits of environmental protection also vary
throughout the country. For example, a stringent ambient
standard may benefit many people in densely populated areas
8. See Revesz, supra note 1.
9. See Revesz, A Normative Critique,supra note 3.
10. See infra Part I.E.4.
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but only a few elsewhere. Similarly, a particular level of exposure
to a contaminant may be more detrimental if it is combined
with exposure to other contaminants with which it has synergistic effects.11
Third, the costs of meeting a given standard also differ
across geographic regions. For example, a source may have a
large detrimental impact on ambient air quality if it is directly
upwind from a mountain or other topographical barrier. Similarly, a water polluter will have a far larger impact on water
quality standards if it disposes its effluents in relatively small
bodies of water. Climate might also play a role: certain emission
or effluent standards
may be easier (and cheaper) to meet in
12
warmer weather.
In principle, federal regulation could be attentive to these
differences. Such a differentiated approach, however, would
require a staggering amount of information. Clearly, the federal
government does not have a comparative advantage at gathering
such information. Thus, not surprisingly, federal regulation
generally imposes uniform requirements throughout the country. Moreover, even when federal regulation imposes disuniform standards, 13
the differences are not explainable by the factors
discussed above.
This presumption for decentralization should be overcome,
however, if there is a systemic evil in letting states decide the
level of environmental protection that will apply within their
jurisdictions. In my work, I have explored in detail the two
most prominent justifications for vesting responsibility over
environmental regulation at the federal level: that interstate
competition over environmental standards would result in a

11. See James E. Krier, On the Topology of Uniform EnvironmentalStandards in a FederalSystem-And Why It Matters, 54 MD. L. REV. 1226 (1995);
James E. Krier, The IrrationalNational Air Quality Standards:Macro- and
Micro-Mistakes, 22 UCLA L. REV. 323 (1974).

12. See Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 870 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 495 U.S. 910 (1990); Tanners' Council, Inc. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1188
(4th Cir. 1976); American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir.
1976); Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1976).
13. For example, the Clean Air Act imposes disuniform ambient standards, determined by whether an area is covered by the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) or nonattainment programs. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7473,
7502, 7503(1)(A) (1994). These differences tum on what ambient air quality
standards regions had at a particular time, rather than differences in preferences, benefits, or costs. See Revesz supra note 2, at 2347-49.
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regulation is necessary
"race to the bottom,"' 4 and that federal
15
to prevent interstate externalities.
The race-to-the-bottom rationale posits that states will try
to induce geographically mobile firms to locate within their jurisdictions, in order to benefit from additional jobs and tax
revenues, by offering them suboptimally lax environmental
standards. The problem of interstate externalities arises because a state that sends pollution to another state obtains the
labor and fiscal benefits of the economic activity that generates
the pollution but does not suffer the full costs of the activity.
Under these conditions, economic theory maintains that an
undesirably large amount of pollution will cross state lines.
So far, my work has dealt only in passing with a third
prominent justification-that as a result of public choice problems, state political processes will systematically undervalue
the benefits of environmental protection or overvalue its costs,
whereas at the federal level the calculus is more accurate. A
public choice analysis of the problem of environmental regulation in a federal system is next on my research agenda.
B. THE RACE-TO-THE-BOTTOM JusTIFICATIoN
My argument attacking the race-to-the-bottom justification
proceeds in four steps. 6 I start by pointing out that when
states compete for industry through environmental standards,
they are competing for the sale of a good: the right to locate
within their jurisdictions. If competition for the sale of most
goods is generally good, why should competition for the sale of
this good be clearly bad? I show, moreover, why possible distinctions between a state as seller of location rights and sellers
of traditional consumer products do not provide support for
race-to-the-bottom claims.
Second, I analyze the leading economic model of the effects
of interstate competition on the choice of environmental standards, which shows that interjurisdictional competition leads
to the maximization of social welfare, rather than to a race to
the bottom. In this model, Wallace Oates and Robert Schwab
posit jurisdictions that compete for mobile capital through the

14. See Revesz, supra note 1.
15. See Revesz, supra note 2.
16. See Revesz, A Normative Critique, supra note 3, at 99-107; Revesz,
supra note 1, at 1233-44.
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17
choice of taxes and environmental standards. A higher capital stock benefits residents in the form of higher wages, but
hurts them as a result of the foregone tax revenues and lower
environmental quality needed to attract the capital.
Each jurisdiction makes two policy decisions: it sets a tax
rate on capital and establishes an environmental standard.
Professors Oates and Schwab show that competitive jurisdictions will set a net tax rate on capital of zero (the rate that exactly covers the cost of public services provided to the capital,
such as police and fire protection). In turn, competitive jurisdictions will set an environmental standard that is defined by
equating the willingness to pay for an additional unit of environmental quality with the corresponding change in wages.
Professors Oates and Schwab show that these choices 18of tax
rates and environmental standards are socially optimal.
Third, I acknowledge that, in particular instances, gametheoretic interactions among the states could lead to underregulation absent federal intervention. In such cases, federal
minimum standards would be desirable. But it is equally
plausible that in other instances the reverse would be true:
that game-theoretic interactions among the states would lead
to overregulation absent federal intervention.19 In such cases,
federal regulation would be desirable as well, but in such cases
federal maximum standards would be called for. Accordingly,
there is no compelling race-to-the-bottom justification for
across-the-board federal minimum standards, which are the
cornerstone of federal environmental law. For example, if an
industry exhibits increasing returns to scale rather than constant returns to scale (an important assumption in the Oates
and Schwab model), depending on the levels of firm-specific
costs, plant-specific costs, and transportation costs, interstate
competition can produce either suboptimally lax or suboptimally stringent levels of pollution. Similarly, if a firm has
market power enabling it to affect prices, it will be able to extract a suboptimally lax standard, but if a state has market
power the reverse would be true.

17. Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab, Economic Competition Among
Jurisdictions:Efficiency Enhancing or DistortionInducing?, 35 J. PUB. ECON.
333, 336 (1988).
18. See id. at 342.
19. See Revesz, A Normative Critique, supra note 3, at 104-05; Revesz,
supra note 1, at 1241-42.
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Fourth, I argue that even if states systematically enacted
suboptimally lax environmental standards, federal environmental regulation would not necessarily improve the situation.
If states cannot compete over environmental regulation because it has been federalized, they will compete along other
regulatory dimensions, leading to suboptimally lax standards
in other areas, or along the fiscal dimension, leading to the underprovision of public goods. Thus, the reduction in social welfare implicit in race-to-the-bottom arguments would not be
eliminated merely by federalizing environmental regulation:
the federalization of all regulatory and fiscal decisions would
be necessary to solve the problem.
C. THE INTERSTATE EXTERNALITY JUSTIFICATION
With respect to the interstate externality justification for
federal environmental regulation, four features of my argument are worth emphasizing.2" First, the presence of interstate
externalities provides a compelling argument for federal regulation under conditions in which Coasian bargaining is unlikely to occur. Particularly with respect to air pollution,
transaction costs are likely to be sufficiently high to prevent
the formation of interstate compacts. It is difficult for such
compacts to emerge in the absence of a clearly defined baseline
concerning when upwind states have the right to send pollution
downwind and in the absence of generally accepted mathematical models for translating a source's emissions into a
quantity of ambient air quality degradation at all the places at
which the emissions affect ambient air quality. Moreover, for
different pollution sources, the range of affected states will
vary; this shifting membership among the participants at the
bargaining table makes it less likely that
the emergence of
21
conditions favoring cooperation will occur.
Second, the fact that interstate externalities provide a
compelling justification for intervention does not mean that all
federal environmental regulation can be justified on these
grounds. For environmental problems such as the control of
drinking water quality, there are virtually no interstate pollution
externalities; the effects are almost exclusively local. Even
with respect to problems for which there are interstate exter20. See Revesz, A Normative Critique, supra note 3, at 107-20; Revesz,

supra note 2, at 2346-74.
2L See Revesz, supra note 2, at 2375 & n.123.
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nalities, such as air pollution, the rationale calls only for a response specific to the problem. This may include a limit on the
amount of pollution that can cross state lines, rather than
across-the-board federal regulation."
Third, the environmental statutes have been an ineffective
response to the problem of interstate externalities. For example,
the core of the Clean Air Act-the statute designed to deal with
the pollution that gives rise to the most serious problems of interstate externalities-consists of a series of federally prescribed
ambient standards and emission standards.23 The federal
emission standards do not effectively combat the problem of interstate externalities because they do not regulate the number
of sources within a state or the location of the sources. Similarly, the various federal ambient air quality standards are not
well-targeted to address the problem of interstate externalities.
They are overinclusive because they require a state to restrict
pollution that has only in-state consequences. But they are
also underinclusive because a state could meet the applicable
ambient standards but nonetheless export a great deal of pollution to downwind states (through tall stacks or a location
near the interstate border). In fact, a state might meet its
ambient standards precisely because it exports a large proportion of its pollution.
Fourth, in some ways the federal environmental statutes
have exacerbated, rather than ameliorated, the problem of interstate externalities. Again, in the context of the Clean Air
Act, the federal ambient standards give states an incentive to
encourage sources within their jurisdiction to use taller stacks.
In this way, states can externalize not only the health and environmental effects of the pollution but also the regulatory
costs of complying with the federal ambient standards. Thus,
not surprisingly, the use of tall stacks expanded considerably
after the passage of the Clean Air Act in 1970. In 1970, only
two stacks in the United States were higher than 500 feet. By
1985, more than 180 stacks were higher than 500 feet and
22. See Revesz, supra note 1, at 1222-23 (noting that the distinction between
race-to-the-bottom and interstate externality rationales is essential for determining the scope of federal regulation).
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1994) (national ambient air quality standards);
id. § 7411 (emission standards for new sources); see also Revesz, supra note 1,
at 1225. Ambient standards prescribe maximum permissible concentration of
pollutants in air, but do not directly constrain the behavior of individual polluters. Emission standards, in contrast, impose enforceable limitations on
individual sources. See id.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:535

twenty-three were higher than 1000 feet. While this method of
externalizing pollution is now less of a problem as a result of
stack height regulations that followed the 1977 amendments to
the Clean Air Act, tall stacks remain a means by which excessive pollution can be sent to downwind states.

D. THE PUBLIC CHOICE JUSTIFICATION
As indicated above, I have not yet tackled in any comprehensive way the public choice analysis of issues concerning
federalism and environmental regulation. I have taken a
somewhat skeptical view, however, of the assertion, largely
undefended in the legal literature, that federal regulation is
necessary to correct for the systematic underprotection of environmental quality at the state level.24
First, it is not enough to say that state political processes
undervalue the benefits of environmental regulation, or overvalue the corresponding costs. Federal regulation is justifiable
only if the outcome at the federal level is socially more desirable,
either because there is less underregulation or because any
overregulation leads to smaller social welfare losses.
Second, given the standard public choice argument for federal environmental regulation, it is not clear why the problems
observed at the state level would not be replicated at the federal level. The logic of collective action would suggest that the
large number of citizen-breathers, each with a relatively small
stake in the outcome of a particular standard-setting proceeding, will be overwhelmed in the political process by concentrated industrial interests with a large stake in the outcome.
But this problem could occur at the federal level as well as at
the state level. In fact, the logic of collective action makes it
difficult to explain why there is any federal regulation at all.
Third, an extensive public choice literature suggests that
impetus for environmental regulation sometimes comes, implicitly or explicitly, from the regulated firms themselves,
which can obtain rents and barriers to entry that give them an
advantage over their competitors. 25 At other times, particular

24. See Revesz, A Normative Critique,supra note 3, at 124-25.
25. See Nathaniel 0. Keohane, Richard L. Revesz & Robert N. Stavins,
The Positive PoliticalEconomy of Instrument Choice in EnvironmentalPolicy,
in ENVIONMENTAL EcONOMIcs AND PUBLIC POLICY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
WALLACE OATES (Paul Portney & Robert Schwab eds., forthcoming).
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hoping to obtain
regions of the country advocate a federal role,
26
a comparative advantage over other regions.
When the relevant interactions are seen in this manner,
the case for federal regulation on public choice grounds is considerably weakened. A more definitive conclusion, however,
must await further sustained analysis.
E. TOWARD DESIRABLE FEDERAL INTERVENTION
The preceding discussion shows why the three principal
justifications for federal intervention are unlikely to justify a
large-scale displacement of state authority. Nonetheless, there
is an important role for federal intervention to correct various
pathologies that otherwise would result. 27
1. Interstate Externalities: The preceding discussion has
focused on pollution externalities, principally air pollution that
crosses state lines, and has shown why the existence of such
externalities provides a compelling reason for federal regulation.
Other externalities that merit federal regulation arise with respect to different environmental problems. For example, to the
extent that certain endangered species are located in a particular state, the costs of protection are largely concentrated in
that state. The benefits of preservation, however, accrue nationally, or, for that matter, globally.
Similarly, out-of-state citizens place value on the existence
of certain natural resources-even resources that they never
plan to use. Such existence, or non-use, values provide a powerful justification for federal control over exceptional natural
resources such as national parks.
2. Economies of Scale: Advocates of federal regulation often maintain, though without much empirical support, that
centralization has strong economies of scale advantages. The
economies-of-scale argument is most plausible in the early
stages of the regulatory process, particularly with respect to
the determination of the adverse effects of particular pollutants
through risk assessment. Indeed, there is little reason for this
determination to be replicated by each state.
The force of the rationale, however, is far less compelling
at the standard-setting phase. At this stage, not only are the
savings from eliminating duplication of efforts likely to be
26. See B. Peter Pashigian, Environmental Regulation: Whose SelfInterestsAre Being Protected?,23 ECON. INQUIRY 551 (1985).
27. See Revesz, A Normative Critique,supra note 3, at 121-24.
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much lower, but centralization will have serious social costs as
a result of the difficulty of setting standards that are responsive to the preferences and physical conditions of different regions.28
3. Uniformity: As previously discussed, federal environmental standards are generally minimum standards. The
states remain free to impose more stringent standards if they
wish. Some standards that apply to pesticides and mobile
sources,29 such as automobiles, however, act as both floors and
ceilings: they preempt both more stringent and less stringent
state standards. Uniformity of this sort can be desirable for
products with important economies of scale in production. In
such cases, disparate regulation would break up the national
market for the product and be costly in terms of foregone
economies of scale.
The benefits of uniformity, however, are less compelling in
the case of process standards, which govern the environmental
consequences of the manner in which goods are produced
rather than the consequences of the products themselves. Indeed, unlike the case of dissimilar product standards, there can
be a well functioning common market regardless of the process
standards governing the manufacture of the products traded in
the market.
4. Protectionof Minimum Levels of Public Health: There is
a powerful notion, informed in part by constitutional considerations, that a federal polity should ensure all its citizens a
minimum level of environmental protection. 30 At some level,
this justification is compelling. A minimum level of health
ought to count as a basic human right, in the same manner as
minimum levels of education, housing, or access to employment.
There are two major problems, however, with justifying
federal environmental regulation in this manner. First, for
understandable reasons of administrative practicality, federal
environmental regulation seeks to limit the risk of exposure to
particular pollutants or sources of pollutants, rather than to
limit aggregate levels of environmental risk. As a result, such
28. See supra text accompanying notes 9-12.
29. See 7 U.S.C. § 136(u) (1994) (pesticides); 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (1994)
(mobile sources).
30. Some federal role with respect to environmental regulation might also
be justified by the federal government's responsibility to implement obligations
flowing from international treaties.
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regulation is both overinclusive (it regulates more than that
which has a claim to quasi-constitutional legitimacy) and underinclusive (it makes no effort to determine aggregate exposure levels; therefore, some individuals may in fact be less protected than the minimum). Second, because environmental
risks are only one component of health risks, it is difficult to
understand why the federal government should have such a
preeminent role in environmental regulation when it does
relatively little with respect to the provision of general health
care. In fact, investments in preventive measures such as immunizations or prenatal care would have a far larger impact on
health than investments in environmental regulation.
Thus, the justification for federal regulation based on the
need to guarantee a minimum level of health calls for a radically different form of regulation than that currently in effect.
It demands an approach that focuses on the aggregate of environmental health risks and the interactions between environmental health risks and other health risks.
II. A RESPONSE TO CRITICS
Despite the daunting length of the work of my four critics,3 relatively few analytical disagreements separate us. This
Part proceeds by categorizing the major areas of dispute and
responding to the relevant arguments for each area.
A. COMMINGLING THE ARGUMENTS FOR CENTRALIZATION
In my work, I have been careful to distinguish among raceto-the-bottom, interstate externality, and public choice arguments for federal intervention. I have shown that each of these
distinct and can arise without the
problems is analytically
32
presence of the others.
My goal has been not only to promote analytical clarity,
but also to determine the appropriate federal response. For
example, a systemic public choice problem at the state level
would call for across-the-board federal intervention, though
only if the problem was likely to be less serious at the federal

31" My critics' works total approximately 350 pages in length, ten times
the length of my original race-to-the-bottom article on which they primarily

focus.
32. See Revesz, A Normative Critique,supra note 3, at 98-99; Revesz, supra
note 2, at 2343 & n.2; Revesz, supra note 1, at 1222-24.
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level.3 3 A pervasive race-to-the-bottom problem would justify
federal environmental regulation of all firms with geographic
mobility, with the goal of preventing destructive interstate
competition.3 4 In contrast, an interstate externality problem
would call for a far more targeted approach, designed to eliminate the externality without displacing a jurisdiction's ability
to choose the levels of environmental
protection best suited to
35
its particular characteristics.
Professor Esty repeatedly conflates these three concepts.
For example, he states: 'From a policy perspective, the key
question is not whether, theoretically, we could design a world
without races to the bottom, but whether we now live in one.
Interstate pollution spill overs are pervasive, as are public
choice distortions of the political process." 36 He appears dismissive of any attempts to keep the arguments as analytically
distinct:
Revesz could argue that the inefficiency arises here not because of
regulatory competition [a race-to-the-bottom issue] but rather because of public choice failures. As a matter of pure theory, this might
be correct, but to ignore the realities of the political marketplace reduces the strength of
any policy conclusions that might be drawn
37
from such theorizing.

Obviously, if there are interstate spillovers, one should
fashion a federal regulatory response that properly addresses
them. Similarly, if there are public choice problems at the
state level, one should ask whether they would be less serious
at the federal level. Nothing, however, is gained, and a great
deal of analytical clarity is lost, by invoking the race-to-thebottom label whenever some other pathology is present.3 8

33. See supra Part I.D.
34. See Revesz, supra note 1, at 1224.
35.

See supra Part I.C.

36. Esty, supra note 5, at 637. Professor Esty also notes that "the assumption of perfect information that undergirds perfect competition theories
cannot be squared with the reality of environmental policymaking," which includes factors such as "the natural political tendency to discount unknown
and uncertain future harms." Id. at 631-32. Similarly, he argues: "It is the
very prospect of systematic undervaluation of environmental benefits by politicians that renders the analogy to a perfectly competitive market inapt." Id
at 633 n.233.
37. Id. at 633 n.237.
38. The existence of one type of problem, however, can exacerbate another problem.
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B. CHALLENGING THE PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF
DECENTRALIZATION

Professor Esty's primary complaint about my work ap39
pears to center around my presumption for decentralization.
He complains that I "go so far as to argue that decentralized
regulation should be considered 'presumptively beneficial.'" 40
Professor Esty attempts to challenge this presumption by
noting that states act strategically in competing for industry,
and that as a result, interstate competition will not be welfareenhancing. 4 1 As set forth above, I explain in my own work that
in some cases states will engage in game-theoretic interactions
that will be welfare decreasing, but I also stress that these inter42
actions could lead to overregulation as well as underregulation.
But this possibility does not cast a cloud on the presumption
for decentralization.
The structure of my argument is reasonably straightforward. The presumption for decentralization rests on three important regional differences in our country: differences in preferences over environmental protection, as well as differences in
benefits and costs of such protection. 43 This presumption, however, can be rebutted if market failures or other pathologies
would result from interstate competition. 44 Then, one would
have to evaluate, without the benefit of any presumption,
whether the social-welfare benefits that would come from fed39. See supra Part .A.
40. Esty, supra note 5, at 572. Professor Esty states that the argument
that "decentralized regulation should be considered 'presumptively beneficial," id. at 572, is "provocatively stark," id. at 573 n.9. He adds: "Revesz
...makes the additional leap to a policy prescription presumptively favoring
decentralized regulation. It is here that his logic most seriously falters." Id.
at 636. Professor Esty also notes that "the goal of giving people control over
their own environmental destinies provides no basis for a sweeping presumption in favor of decentralized environmental decision making." Id. at 648.
41. Professor Esty asserts: "Revesz asks rhetorically: 'If one believes that
competition among sellers of widgets is socially desirable, why is competition
among sellers of location rights socially undesirable?' The answer to this
question is straightforward: states act strategically." Id. at 630; see also id. at
634 ("The conclusion that I draw is a modest one: the scope for failure in the
market for environmental-policy-determined location rights is significant
enough to make untenable a presumption that regulatory competition in this
domain will be welfare enhancing.").
42. See supra text accompanying note 19.
43. See supra text accompanying notes 8-12. Professor Esty does not appear to take issue with the presence of such regional differences. See Esty,
supra note 5, at 647-48.
44. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:535

eral regulation are greater than the losses that would result
from a centralized regulatory regime.
Thus, the belief that game-theoretic interactions among
the states consistently lead to social-welfare losses is not a reason to reject either my analytical framework or my arguments
in favor of a presumption for decentralization. Instead, one
might simply say that the presumption is rebutted by the presence
of this market failure.
At times, it appears that Professor Esty misunderstands
my analytical framework. Referring to my article on interstate
externalities, he states that I "seem[] to have begun to back
away from [my] position" concerning the presumption for decentralization.4 5 Since that article does not discuss such a presumption
at all, Professor Esty must have reached his conclusion on the
basis of my discussion about why interstate externalities provide a compelling argument for federal regulation.4 6 That discussion, however, merely implies that the presumption should
be rebutted when pollution problems have interjurisdictional
consequences.
Of course, Professor Esty is entitled to develop his own
analytical framework, rather than to react to mine. Since he
does not offer such a framework himself, I speculate on what
an approach consistent with his positions might look like.
Whereas the regional differences across the country form the
starting point for my analysis, his starting point could be the
market failure resulting from interstate competition. Then, he
could ask whether the presence of regional differences calling
for differentiated standards ought to lead to a rebuttal of his
presumption for centralized regulation. 47 In the case of an affirmative answer, he could weigh which policy would lead to
smaller social welfare49losses. 48 In fact, at times he does apply
such a balancing test.
45. See Esty, supra note 5, at 573 n.9.
46. See supra Part I.C.
47. Professor Esty acknowledges that benefits to decentralization exist.
See Esty, supra note 5, at 606-07. In fact, he premises his discussion of what
he calls "internalities," id. at 587-90, on the notion that welfare losses occur
when local preferences diverge from those of the broader jurisdiction, id. at
589 n.54.
48. Professor Esty acknowledges that "the welfare losses from less accurate centralized representation can be serious." Id. at 647.
49. See, e.g., id. at 652 ("Devolution will help to improve environmental
policymaking if it better aligns public values and regulatory outcomes, but the
welfare losses from creating new interjurisdictional externalities and exposing
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To be sure, the two frameworks differ in terms of the evidentiary burdens they impose. But evidentiary issues do not
play a significant role in either Professor Esty's approach or in
mine. Thus, as a practical matter it is unlikely that a great
deal would turn on which framework one chooses.
In sum, Professor Esty obviously disagrees with me concerning the implications of game-theoretic interactions among
the states (an issue to which I will return°). But despite his
many conclusory assertions, Professor Esty does not advance
any sustained argument for criticizing my use of the presumption for decentralization, and does not offer an alternative

analytical framework.
C.

REHABILITATING THE RACE TO THE BoTToM

To their credit, my critics do not attempt to resurrect the
simple-minded, unqualified race-to-the-bottom argument that
had been part of the accepted wisdom among legal academics
when I was a law student, and which I repeated for a few years
after I started teaching. Instead, in each case, the arguments
for rehabilitating the race-to-the-bottom justification for federal environmental regulation are more sophisticated.5 1
1. Perfect Versus Imperfect Competition
Professor Engel argues that the assumption of perfect
competition, which undergirds the Oates and Schwab model, is
inapposite to the case of competition among states for mobile
the technical incapacity of many decentralized governmental units may overwhelm any representativeness gains obtained."). He adds: "Sometimes, the
externalities corrected will be relatively small in comparison to the representativeness losses incurred by moving to a higher level of government. In other
cases, regulatory failures... will outweigh the gains obtained by correcting a
jurisdictional externality." Id. at 653.
50. See infraPart 1I.C.2.
51. Susan Rose-Ackerman, EnvironmentalPolicy and FederalStructure:
A Comparison of the United States and Germany, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1587
(1994), presents an interesting example. She examines the situation in which
one state levies a tax on those who generate loud noises whereas another
state imposes an ex ante standard. The firm will prefer to locate in the latter
state even though, from an efficiency perspective, it should be indifferent between the two. See id. at 1592-93. What is driving this result is the net revenue that the former state receives under the tax scheme, rather than differential noise levels. Her observation that interstate competition will affect
states' taxing abilities is generally consistent with the analysis in the model
by Professors Baumol and Oates that interstate competition will lead to underregulation if states choose positive net tax rates. See infra text accompanying
notes 64-65.
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capital. In my work, I pointed out that under certain circumstances interstate competition will depart from the social optimum
achieved under perfect competition (and that in those circumstances the result could be either overregulation or underregulation).52 Professor Esty, however, appears to believe that the
model of perfect competition is never appropriate. Professor
Esty argues:
Unlike firms in perfect competition, states in their regulatory mode
are not pure price takers. They cannot ignore the fact that a slight
reduction in environmental standards (the price of their location
rights) might bring economic welfare gains in excess of any losses
from the resulting environmental degradation. In contrast, perfectly
competitive firms face no such incentive because they can sell any
53
quantity that they choose at the market-clearing price.

Consider the functioning of a competitive market for, say,
widgets. The market-clearing price will be determined by the
intersection of the aggregate supply and the aggregate demand
functions. Individual producers, who cannot affect this market
price, must decide the quantity that they want to sell at this
price. Each such firm will produce up to the point at which its
marginal cost (the cost of an additional unit of production)
equals the market-clearing price.
What would happen if the firm attempted to sell at less
than the competitive price? Obviously, it would attract more
potential customers; in fact, every buyer in the market would
want to purchase from this firm. However, if the firm's cost
function is convex (a necessary assumption for the functioning
of competitive markets), the firm would choose to sell less,
rather than more, at this lower price. A convex cost function
implies that additional units become progressively more expensive to produce. Thus, there will be units that the firm
could have produced at the competitive price but that it cannot
produce at an infracompetitive price.
Moreover, the firm will be worse off selling at an infracompetitive price. As indicated above, there are units that it could
have sold at a profit at the competitive price but that it will not
52. See supra text accompanying note 19.
53. Esty, supra note 5, at 630-31. Professor Esty complains that my raceto-the-bottom article takes inconsistent positions: "[While much of the early
part ... focuses on the environmental policy challenges as a prisoner's dilemma and implies strategic behavior and imperfect competition, he then
shifts abruptly to a discussion of regulatory competition." Id. at 630 n.222. In
contrast, Professor Engel rightly recognizes that my purpose in the early part
of the article is "to illustrate the approach he then goes on to oppose." Engel,
supra note 4, at 298 n.73.
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produce (and on which it will not make a profit) at an infracompetitive price.
The conclusion would be different, however, if the marketclearing price were a supracompetitive price arising from collusion among the sellers, rather than the competitive price.
Then, a firm could indeed increase its profits by expanding its
production and selling at less than what had previously been
the market-clearing price. The additional profits that the firm
received from the additional units that it produced would be
greater than the loss of profits resulting from charging a lower
price.
The analysis would be no different for a market in location
rights. Thus, when Professor Esty asserts that states can obtain net social welfare gains if they reduce their environmental
standards below the market-clearing level he must be implicitly
assuming that there is collusion among the states, as sellers of
location rights, to charge supracompetitive prices.
Professor Esty adduces no evidence showing why the market
for location rights might behave this way. But if the market in
location rights in fact produced supracompetitive prices (in the
form of suboptimally stringent environmental standards), the
correct federal policy would be federal ceilings (in the form of
maximum standards), which would preempt more stringent
state standards. Such a policy would be the precise opposite of
the status quo that Professor Esty is attempting to justify,
which consists of federal floors (federal minimum standards)
that preempt less stringent state standards.5 4
2. Direction of the Race
The primary goal of Professors Engel and Esty appears to
be to defend the status quo of federal regulation against arguments in favor of decentralization. 5 They argue extensively
that, as a result of game-theoretic interactions among the states,
interstate competition might not lead to the maximization of
social welfare. Their theoretical arguments fail to show, however, that the result would be underregulation rather than
overregulation.5 6 Thus, their policy prescription-support for

54. See infra Part H.C.2.
55. See Engel, supra note 4, at 374-75; Esty, supra note 5, at 570-71.
56. See infra Part H.0.3.
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federal minimum standards-does not fit their diagnosis of the
problem.5
For example, Professor Esty relies on the recent studies,
discussed above,58 which show that for an industry that exhibits increasing returns to scale, rather than constant returns to
scale, interstate competition will not lead to the maximization
of social welfare.5 9 But as I previously explained, depending on
the structure of various cost functions, suboptimality could result in standards that are either too lax or too stringent." Professor Esty has made no attempt to argue that the cost functions that lead to underregulation are more likely than the cost
functions that lead to overregulation.
Professor Esty also makes inconsistent arguments with respect to the direction of the race. The Oates and Schwab model
predicts that if states set a positive net tax rate on capital (a
rate higher than that needed to cover the cost of public services
provided to the capital), they will choose environmental standards that are suboptimally lax. Professor Esty refers to "the
pervasiveness of positive tax rates on capital,"" thus implying
that interstate competition would produce a race to the bottom.
He does not provide any support, however, for his assertion
concerning the structure of tax rates, and the evidence on this
question is mixed.62
In fact, elsewhere in his article, Professor Esty refers to
the fact that there may be a winner's curse on the part of states
bidding for investment under which the states that "win" the
competition to attract firms are those that give the firms excessive concessions in the form of suboptimally lax environmental standards. 63 If there is indeed such a curse, an obvious
57. See supra text accompanying note 55.
58. See supra p. 539.

59. See Esty, supra note 5, at 631 &nn.224-25.
60. See supra text accompanying note 19.
61. See Esty, supra note 5, at 635. In fact, Professor Esty states that my
initial race-to-the-bottom article "recogniz[es]" this pervasiveness. Id. However, I state explicitly that the evidence of whether net tax rates are positive
or negative is mixed. See Revesz, A Normative Critique, supra note 3, at 104

& n.6 ("There is no consensus in the academic literature on whether, on average, states and localities tax or subsidize capital ....

.");

Revesz, supra note 1,

at 1244 ("There is extensive literature on whether local property taxes are
nondistortionary benefit taxes ... or, whether, instead, they are distortionary
taxes on capital .... [N]either the theoretical nor the empirical work points
clearly in one direction.").
62. See supra note 61.

63. See Esty, supra note 5, at 632. Professor Swire alludes to this issue as
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possibility is that states would give firms important tax
breaks,.' resulting, presumably, in negative tax rates on capital.
competiThen, under the Oates and Schwab model, interstate
65
tion would lead to suboptimally stringent standards.
Professor Engel acknowledges explicitly that when interstate competition leads to suboptimality, the direction of the
suboptimality cannot be easily predicted.6 6 She appears to believe, however, that this feature is unimportant from a policy
perspective:
The distinction between states following each other in setting
more stringent or less stringent standards (or both) is not as important as it might seem.... Because the race-to-the-bottom is simply
a race to inefficiency, the race can occur both when states adopt
standards that are too stringent as well as when states adopt standards that are too lax.67

well. See Swire, supra note 7, at 103. Note, moreover, that a winner's curse
could exist on the other side of the transaction, under which firms that "win"
the competition to receive permission to locate are the ones that offer excessive concessions in the form of agreeing to comply with suboptimally stringent
environmental standards.
64. See Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce
Clause Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV.
377, 382-89 (1996) (discussing state business tax incentives).
65. See Revesz, supra note 1, at 1243.
66. See Engel, supra note 4, at 345 ("[Mt is unclear whether this strategic
interaction prompts states to establish more or less stringent standards ....
[Sltates [may] duplicate each other's standards regardless of whether they are
lax or stringent."); see also id. at 361, 364 (discussing extensions of the Oates
& Schwab model that produce suboptimality).
67. Id. at 346. None of the sources on which Professor Engel relies, see
id. at 298 n.76, provide general support for federal minimum standards as a
response to a race to the bottom. Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Steadying the Court's 'Unsteady Path A Theory of Judicial Enforcement of
Federalism,68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1447 (1995), deals primarily with the subject of
trade wars. See id. at 1475-76. As I explain elsewhere, the problem of interstate
competition leading to protectionist trade measures is analytically distinct
from the problem of interstate competition leading to suboptimal environmental
process standards. See Revesz, Lessons for the European Union and the International Community, supra note 3. James A. Brander, Economic Policy
Formation in a Federal State: A Game Theoretic Approach, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 33 (Richard Simeon ed., 1985), primarily models a
situation in which two states compete over a single firm, id. at 47; the firm
then has market power and underregulation will result, id. at 48-53; see supra
text accompanying note 19. Kathryn Harrison, The Regulator's Dilemma:
Regulation of Pulp Mill Effluents in the CanadianFederal State, 29 CAN. J.
POL. SO. 469 (1996) focuses on public choice arguments, stressing the "diffuse
benefits of environmental protection relative to job creation." Id. at 479; see
infra Part .E (challenging simple-minded public choice arguments). Eli M.
Noam, Government Regulation of Business in a FederalState: Allocation of Power
Under Deregulation, 20 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 762 (1982) shows that interstate
competition can lead to either underregulation or overregulation. See id. at 768.
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But if the goal is to justify federal minimum standards, it
is critical to know whether they are likely to correct the problem
or make it worse.
3. Significance of Empirical Findings
Professor Engel notes that two different types of models
are juxtaposed against one another in the current debate over
the existence of a race to the bottom:
According to the non-cooperative game-theoretic models relied upon
by adherents to the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis, the market for
firm location is imperfect; crippled by strategic interactions between
the state participants, it causes states to establish suboptimal environmental standards. In contrast, under the neoclassical economic
model held out by the revisionists, this same market is perfectly
competitive and hence leads to efficient state environmental standards.68

On the basis of an extensive empirical study, she argues
that the former models are "likely to supply a more appropriate
conceptual framework... in understanding the interactions of
the state market participants." 69 While the evidence that Professor Engel presents is interesting and will certainly enrich
the debate over the future of federal environmental law, one
cannot draw from it any clear-cut conclusions concerning the
question that she would like to illuminate.
Professor Engel relies on two separate sources of empirical
evidence. First, she notes that "nearly one-third of all environmental regulators claimed that their state had altered a
standard when another state had a less stringent requirement
for a similar standard, and somewhat fewer state regulators
claimed that their state had done the same thing when confronted by another state's more stringent standard." 0
Such "price" adjustments, however, are not necessarily inconsistent with a competitive market. Even in a competitive
market, prices are not frozen in time. Changes in prices can
occur as a result of shifts in the demand curve, which determines the relationship between the quantity of a good that
consumers would be willing to purchase and the price of the
good. Such shifts can result, for example, from changes in consumer preferences that make the good either more or less desirable to potential consumers. Alternatively, changes in

68. Engel, supra note 4, at 310.
69. Id. at 356.

70. Id.
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prices can occur as a result of shifts in the supply curve, which
determines the relationship between the quantity of a good
that producers would be willing to supply and the price of the
good. Such shifts can result, for example, from technological
innovation or from changes in the prices of inputs. The price
adjustments caused by shifts in the demand or supply curve
need not be instantaneous: one firm might act first and others
will then follow. Thus, it is not possible to reach any strong
conclusions from Professor Engel's empirical observation.
Professor Engel's other empirical finding is adduced to
support both her challenge to models of perfect competition
and her argument that interstate competition will lead to
suboptimally lax standards. Professor Engel reports, on the
basis of a survey of individuals responsible for or influential in
state environmental standard-setting, that "a substantial minority of states relax their environmental standards in order to
attract industrial firms."71 Professor Engel couples this finding
with the conclusion of a number of empirical studies that show
that the level of environmental regulation plays a relatively
small role in firm location decisions. 2 Thus, she argues that "if
(1) states compete for industry by lowering environmental
standards, but (2) industry location is substantially unaffected
by this competition, it logically follows that (3) states' welfare
gain to comwill be reduced because there will be no economic
73
pensate for the environmental quality losses."
Making environmental standards more lax is undesirable
from a social welfare perspective only if the baseline from
which the relaxation takes place was optimal. In contrast, the
baseline may have been a standard that was too stringent,
perhaps because the state believed that it had "monopoly
power" in the market. In such cases, the state's monopoly
status would give rise to a social welfare loss. This loss would
then be reduced by the relaxation of the environmental standards. Professor Engel's empirical study sheds no light on the
stringency of the baseline.
Moreover, while the evidence from firm location studies
shows, as Professor Engel maintains, that the stringency of
environmental standards plays a small role in firm location
decisions, it does not show that this factor is wholly irrele-

7L Id. at 279; see 1d. at 337-40 (describing the survey).
72. See id. at 321-37.
73. Id. at 279.
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vant 4 If relaxing environmental standards has some effect,
though smaller than other factors, on industrial location decisions, it could well be the case that states derive positive net
benefits when they make their environmental standards less
stringent. In addition, Professor Engel's survey does not inquire specifically about firm expansion decisions, which could
be affected by the stringency of the environmental standards.
D. FUTILITY OF FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AS A
CURE TO THE RACE TO THE BoTToM

Professor Esty also takes issue with my argument that if a
race to the bottom exists, federal environmental regulation will
simply transfer the race to other regulatory areas, or to the fiscal arena, without any reason to expect social welfare gains.
He states that "[t]his suggestion makes little sense." 5 His full
explanation reads as follows:
Fundamentally, this line of analysis fails to recognize the technical
complexity of environmental policymaking as well as the irreversible
nature of some environmental harms. Thus, driving interstate competition out of the inherently obscure realm of environmental policy and into
that of other governmental activities, where the costs and benefits of
various policies are more easily compared, will be beneficial' 6

Professor Esty makes reference to three distinct factors:
technical complexity, irreversibility, and difficulty in comparing costs and benefits. He does not explain, however, why
these phenomena lead to smaller social welfare losses if the

undesirable interstate competition for industry takes place
with respect to non-environmental programs.
First, even if there is more uncertainty surrounding the
comparison of costs and benefits for environmental regulation
than for other regulatory programs, it does not follow that federal environmental regulation would have beneficial effects.
The race to the bottom is a form of a prisoner's dilemma." The

traditional representation of a prisoner's dilemma does not de-

74. See id. at 321-37; J. Vernon Henderson, Effects ofAir Quality Regulation, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 789, 800-05 (1996); Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039,
2050, 2076 (1993). For an excellent review of the empirical literature, see
Adam B. Jaffe et al., Environmental Regulation and the Competitiveness of
U.S. Manufacturing: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?, 33 J. ECON. LITERATURE 132 (1995).
75. Esty, supra note 5, at 638 n.255.
76. Id.
77. See Revesz, supra note 1, at 1217-18.
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pend on uncertainties in the payoffs of the different outcomes.
It is undoubtedly the case that certain types of uncertainty
7
could exacerbate the social welfare losses. 1 Uncertainty, how79
Thus, if the race to
ever, could also have beneficial effects.
the bottom could take place over only one regulatory program,
social welfare losses would not necessarily be smaller if the
competition for capital took place with respect to the program
8°
with more certain costs and benefits, as Professor Esty implies.
78. See Stewart, supra note 74, at 2059. Uncertainty could turn into a
prisoner's dilemma a situation that would have had a socially less detrimental
structure under conditions of certainty.
79. Consider, first, the operation of a prisoner's dilemma under conditions
of certainty. Two prisoners, Row and Column, are to be questioned by a
prosecutor. If neither confesses, they each will be convicted of a crime carrying
a three-year sentence; if both confess, there is sufficient evidence to convict
each of a more serious crime, carrying a five-year sentence. If one of them
confesses and the other does not, the defendant who confesses receives a oneyear sentence (to reflect the value of his cooperation) whereas the other defendant receives a six-year sentence (to reflect her lack of cooperation). The
following matrix presents the various payoffs (the first number in each box is
Row's sentence; the second number is Column's sentence).

Row

No confession
Confession

Column
Confession
No confession
6,1
3,3
5,5
1,6

If the defendants act rationally, they will both confess, even though they
would both have been better off if neither had confessed.
Now, assume that there is uncertainty over the payoffs, so that Row
and Column both believe, erroneously, that if one defendant confesses and the
other does not, the evidence would be insufficient to convict the nonconfessing defendant of the more serious crime. The following matrix presents Row's and Column's estimates of the payoffs.

Row

No confession

Confession

Column
No confession I Confession
41
3,3

14

5:5

Confession on the part of both defendants is no longer a dominant strategy, because if Row confesses, Column is better off not confessing, and vice
versa. The sentence served by each of the defendants is lower than it would
have been under conditions of certainty.
80. In part of his article, Professor Swire appears to recognize that the
existence of uncertainty could result in either suboptimally stringent or
suboptimally lax standards: "[Regulators] may relax environmental laws in
situations where stronger laws would increase social welfare. Conversely,
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Second, he might be assuming implicitly that the federal
government would do a better job than the states at comparing
costs and benefits or dealing with the technical complexity inherent in environmental regulation. As I explain above, there
are powerful economies of scale arguments for allocating to the
federal level the provision of scientific information necessary
for environmental regulation.8' But underregulation because
of a lack of access to appropriate information on costs and
benefits is not a race-to-the-bottom problem; it would exist
even if capital was wholly immobile. Thus, federalizing these
determinations, while desirable, should not count as a cure for
a race to the bottom, if one existed.
Third, the irreversibility of environmental damage says
little about how authority over environmental regulation
should be allocated between different levels of government.
Rather, it suggests that some uncertainties should be resolved
in a particular direction, towards greater precaution, regardless of which level of government is doing the regulating.

E. RELYING ON PUBLIC CHOICE ARGUMENTS
My critics also rely heavily on public choice arguments in
making their case for centralization. Professor Swire devotes
the most attention to this issue. Relying on familiar concepts
concerning the logic of collective action, he notes: 'For many
important environmental issues, regulations impose costs on
These industry groups would
cohesive industry groups ....
very well politically against
be
expected
to
succeed
ordinarily
the diffuse
individuals who might benefit from environmental
82
controls."
As I indicate above,83 the case for centralization cannot be
made merely by pointing out the disadvantages under which
environmental groups operate. The claim must be that they
systematically perform worse at the state level than at the federal level. Swire explicitly admits that he cannot make this
claim:
they may strengthen environmental laws where the resulting costs to the
economy are greater than the benefits." Swire, supra note 7, at 96.
81. See supra part I.E.2.
82. Swire, supra note 7, at 101. He then explains that NIMBY ("Not in
My Back Yard") situations are different because there the costs of the pollution are concentrated but the benefits are diffuse. See id. at 105-06.
83. See supra Part I.D (questioning the public choice justification for federal regulation).
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The next task, not undertaken here in detail, would be to assess the
relative ability of states and the federal government to correct for
public choice problems. The public choice analysis in this article has
explained reasons to expect both levels of government to underprovide environmental law, compared with the baseline of what the
voters prefer.4

Professor Esty attempts to address this question, though
only in passing. He states: "At the centralized level, environmental groups find it easier to reach critical mass and thereby
85
to compete on more equal footing with industrial interests."
He adds that "[the difficulty of mobilizing the public in many
separate jurisdictions is well established."S6
His claim is far from self-evident. In fact, the logic of collective action might suggest the opposite. The costs of organizing on a larger scale magnify the free-rider problems faced by
environmental groups.
Moreover, because environmental concerns vary throughout the country, there will be political conflict in environmental
interests when they are aggregated at the federal level, thereby
further complicating the organizational problems. For example, environmentalists in Massachusetts may care primarily
about air quality whereas environmentalists in Colorado may
rank the environmental implications of water allocation as
most important. Other things being equal, state-based environmental groups seeking, respectively, better air quality in
Massachusetts and a more environmentally sensitive allocation of
water in Colorado are therefore likely to be more effective than
a national environmental group seeking, at the federal level,
better environmental quality with respect to both of these attributes.
In contrast, the situation is likely to be different for industry
groups. For many environmental problems, an important portion of the regulated community consists of firms with nationwide operations. For such firms, operating at the federal level
poses no additional free-rider problems or loss of homogeneity.
The relevant question is whether the additional problems
faced by environmental groups at the federal level are outweighed by benefits arising from the fact that the clash of interest groups takes place before a single legislature, a single
administrative agency, and, in part, as a result of the exclusive
84. Swire, supra note 7, at 108.
85. Esty, supra note 5, at 650 n.302.
86. Id. at 650-51.
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venue of the D.C. Circuit over important environmental statutes,
in a single court.87 One can imagine models under which public choice problems are, indeed, ameliorated at the federal
level-a task that none of my critics has addressed. The problem, though, is that such models are unlikely to provide a good
account of reality.
For example, if one assumed that beyond a certain
threshold, additional resources do not increase a group's probability of being successful in the political process, and if this
threshold at the federal level is sufficiently lower than the sum
of the corresponding thresholds at the state levels, it may be
that environmental groups would not be at a disadvantage at
the federal level even if they were at a disadvantage in the
states. In this case, the economies of scale of operating at the
federal level more than outweigh the increased free-rider
problems.
The assumptions behind such a model, however, are not
particularly plausible. The threshold concept might properly
describe certain costs associated with effective participation in
the regulatory process. For example, with respect to the regulation of a particular carcinogen, each group might need to hire
a scientist to review the regulator's risk assessment. It may
well be the case that a certain minimum will secure the services of a competent scientist and that devoting additional resources to the problem would be of little, if any, use. Thus, for
costs of this type, the marginal benefit of additional expenditures is zero, or close to zero, regardless of the other party's expenditures.
The structure of other costs, however, is likely to be quite
different. For example, with respect to access to the legislative
process, the standard public choice account is that the highest
bidder prevails.88 Thus, the benefit that a party receives from
its expenditures is a function of the expenditures of the other
party. Unless the costs of this type are quite small, the

87. See Richard L. Revesz, EnvironmentalRegulation, Ideology, and the
D.C. Circuit,83 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 1997).
88. See Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19
J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. 3 (1971). For an extended discussion of public choice

issues surrounding environmental regulation, see Keohane, Revesz & Stavins,
supra note 25.
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are unlikely
economies of scale of operating at the federal level
89
to outweigh the additional free-rider problems.
Finally, if the relevant public choice interactions are characterized as involving the diffuse interests of breathers or
other environmental beneficiaries on one side and the concentrated interests of industrial firms on the other side, there
would be little practical importance to the debate over which
forum is relatively better for the environmentalist interests.
What is important, instead, is that both fora are bad for these
interests as a result of their diffuse nature. As a result, given
this characterization of the problem, it is difficult to explain, in
public choice terms, why there would be any environmental
regulation at all.90 For this reason, as I explain in Part I.D, the
most plausible public choice explanations for environmental
regulation posit that regulated firms obtain benefits from such
regulation in the form of rents and barriers to entry, or that
certain regions in our country can obtain from the regulatory
process advantages relative to other regions.
F. EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF EXISTENCE VALUES
Professor Sarnoff seeks to challenge "the common claim
that federal regulation decreases social welfare by preventing
states and localities from tailoring regulatory requirements to
their citizens' preferences."9 In presenting his position, Professor Sarnoff makes reference to "national evaluative
norms." 92 He argues that "[w]hen national evaluative norms
than state or loare employed, federal regulation is more 9likely
3
cal regulation to increase social welfare."
In searching through Professor Sarnoffs work for the reason this would necessarily be the case, one discovers a troubling circularity in his argument: "National evaluative norms
are the measures of value implicitly adopted when preemptive
federal legislation is enacted."94 Given this definition, it would

A different set of issues is raised by the relative administrative ca89.
pacity of the federal government and the states.
90. Professor Swire acknowledges this difficulty with his argument: "In
light of the straightforward public choice analysis presented here, the puzzle
remains how environmental protection ever succeeds in the political process."
Swire, supra note 7, at 109.
91. Sarnoff, supra note 6, at 231.
92. Id. at 232, 313.
93. Id. at 232 (footnote omitted).
94. Id. at 232 n.18.
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appear that every federal regulation would be desirable from
the standpoint of a "national evaluative norm." Otherwise,
presumably, state law would not have been preempted. This
formulation does not provide any independent metric by which
to judge when federal regulation is desirable.
In other parts of his work, however, Professor Sarnoff
makes a better specified and more traditional welfarist claim.
He notes: "Tailoring requirements to local preferences will not
necessarily increase social welfare, because such tailoring prevents citizens located outside a state from satisfring their preferences for in-state regulation."95 According to his view, even
in the absence of physical externalities, the level of environmental protection chosen by the citizens of a state is of interest
96
to citizens of other states.
Thus, one way to characterize Professor Sarnoffs argument is by reference to the existence values that citizens of one
state attach to the level of environmental quality in other
states. As I explain above, the existence values placed on the
protection of certain natural resources by out-of-staters provide
a powerful justification for federal protection of national
parks.97 Professor Sarnoff appears to believe, however, that
individuals attach significant existence values not only to exceptional natural resources located outside their jurisdiction,
but also to the health of out-of-staters. So, the argument goes,
even absent interstate externalities, an individual in Virginia
ought not to be able to choose the level of environmental protection to which she will be exposed. Indeed, if she picks too
lax a level she will impose costs on individuals in, say, New
York who would have preferred her to have better health.
There are several weaknesses with this position. First,
Professor Sarnoff does not attempt to support his hypothesis
with any empirical evidence. There are many empirical studies showing that individuals place high existence values on exceptional natural resources. I am not familiar, however, with a
literature seeking to ascertain the value that people attach to
the health of unrelated individuals. One could, of course, be
asked a question of the following sort: "How much would you be
95. Id. at 232.
96. See id. at 243 ("State-level values are often employed to assess the
social welfare effects of policy. The consequences of a policy for individuals
located outside a jurisdiction are ignored, unless the policy clearly and substantially imposes external physical harms.").
97. See supra Part I.E.1.
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willing to pay to reduce the probability that someone in another state whom you have never met would face an increase in
the probability of getting cancer from exposure to an environmental contaminant from one in a hundred thousand to one in
a million." My uneducated hunch is that the value given in answer to this question would not be very high.
Second, while some individuals may indeed value reducing
the exposure of out-of-staters to environmental harms, others
might approach the issue in a diametrically different manner.
They might derive value if out-of-staters have access to good
jobs and economic well-being, even if these goals come at the
expense of environmental protection.9" It is even conceivable
that the latter effect would dominate the former, thereby
pushing Professor Sarnoff, if he is faithful to his position, to
advocate federal standards that preempt more stringent state
standards.
Third, even if individuals would significantly value the
goal of preventing out-of-staters from being exposed to egregiously high levels of environmental harms, that would not be
true for less stark exposures to risk. At best, Professor
Sarnoffs argument might justify some federal control over
rather than the
minimum levels of environmental quality 99
status quo of extensive centralized regulation.
CONCLUSION
In summary, my critics have not weakened the analytical
framework set forth in Part I. Most importantly, they have not
provided convincing answers for three key questions concerning
the race-to-the-bottom justification for federal environmental
regulation: (1) why one ought to reject across-the-board a
model of a competitive market in location rights; (2) if gametheoretic interactions among the states lead to a loss in social
welfare, why one should assume that these interactions will
produce underregulation rather than overregulation; (3) if
these interactions produce suboptimally lax standards, why
one should think that federal environmental regulation is
likely to increase social welfare when states can compete over
other regulatory programs or in the fiscal arena.

98. See Donald H. Rosenthal & Robert H. Nelson, Why Existence Values
Should Not Be Used in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 11 J. POLY ANALYSIS & MGMT.
116, 118 (1992).
99. See supra Part I.E.4.
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My critics have also attempted to shift the debate away
from the race-to-the-bottom rationale to interstate externality
and public choice rationales." 0 With respect to interstate externalities, they have not taken issue with the central propositions advanced in my work that such externalities cannot justify, on their own, the extensive body of federal regulation that
has emerged since 1970, or with the view that the current regime is ill-suited to address the problem of interstate externalities.'
With respect to public choice issues, they have advanced the standard argument for why environmental
interests might be underrepresented in the political process
without seriously tackling the issue of whether there is likely
to be more parity of forces at the federal level, or whether any
part of the legal regime, either state or federal, can be explained by reference to a clash between environmentalist and
industry groups.

100. See Daniel A. Farber, Federalismin a GlobalEconomy, 83 VA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 1997) ("Since Revesz's influential article debunking naive theories of the race to the bottom, efforts to rehabilitate the argument often emphasize ... defects in local governments.").
101. See Esty, supra note 5, at 587-97; Swire, supra note 7, at 99-100.

